[Beowulf] iptables
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Bogdan Costescu Bogdan.Costescu at iwr.uni-heidelberg.deThu Sep 29 11:09:16 PDT 2005
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[ OK, I learnt the hard way that (this version of) pine doesn't do spell checking on the Subjectline , but what excuse do you have for not correcting it ? :-) ] On Thu, 29 Sep 2005, Robert [UTF-8] G. Brown wrote: > does anybody have any actual benchmark measurements of the > comparative impact of iptables on code execution rates Well, benchmarking implies a controlled environment. But remember that you want to use iptables to protect from the unknown that is the Internet at large or some evil soul on your closed network - you can't control the timing, quantity and size of packets that you receive. It's fine that you want to know how much enabling iptables costs in the ideal case when there is no mischief, but then how well do you know your enemy to predict how often you are far from the ideal case ? Imagine a cluster node with iptables connected on a campus network (so high packets per second rate between the attacker and the target). The cluster node runs a job of user X; but user Y who has root access on a computer connected to the same campus network decides that X's job should not finish in time because X took Y's parking place. Then Y starts a 'ping -f nodeX', or better yet uses pktgen (which running in kernel space might be more efficient). Even with an iptables setup that drops the offending packets, the effect is visible and it's far from the nano- or microseconds that you mention; I chose dropping the IGMP packet for maximum of efficiency - no response generated as with REJECT, no connection tracking, no fragment assembly, no costly copying to user space, easy to separate from other traffic so can be put close to the first rule. In my previous message, I didn't take into account an increased number of interrupts generated by the network card faced with additional traffic; I just supposed that the card is loaded anyway with useful trafic, so interrupt rate remains similar between ideal and 'under attack' situations. If this is not true and the attacker can induce the generation of a high number of interrupts, then you loose big time (pun intended). -- Bogdan Costescu IWR - Interdisziplinaeres Zentrum fuer Wissenschaftliches Rechnen Universitaet Heidelberg, INF 368, D-69120 Heidelberg, GERMANY Telephone: +49 6221 54 8869, Telefax: +49 6221 54 8868 E-mail: Bogdan.Costescu at IWR.Uni-Heidelberg.De
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